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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
in this article. There are factors,14 however, which possibly might
have diminished the number of these claims to the extent that it
would have presented no problem. They are: the short time within
which the action must be commenced; 15 the common law defenses 16
available to the government; the settlement or compromise of certain
valid claims; 17 and finally, the hesitancy of servicemen to wade
through tedious court procedure with its attendant court costs and
attorney's fees in an effort to supplement substantial compensation to
which they are already entitled.
Whether these factors would eliminate the problem is conjec-
tural. If, however, in the words of the Court, ". . . we misinterpret
the Act, at least Congress possesses a ready remedy." 18
TORTS-LABILITY OF OWNER AND LESSOR FOR INJURIES SUF-
FERE By LEssEE's EMPLOYE.-Plaintiff, a shipyard employee, sus-
tained injuries when a link of chain on a tractor crane broke as he
was assisting those who were operating the crane. The crane was
the property of the defendant Turner who had rented it to the de-
fendant Farrington, who, within two days of receipt, had sublet it
to plaintiff's employer. The evidence showed that the link had
been defectively manufactured, and that the defect (but not its
extent) had been detectable for more than two years before the acci-
dent. Further, there existed several well-known methods of testing
the link. Held, where the nature and use of a chattel are such that
it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when defectively
made or repaired, and it is probable that it will be used without
inspection by persons other than those who could claim the benefit
of implied warranty, the supplier thereof has a duty to use reasonable
care to see that the chattel is reasonably safe for use, even when
there is no actual knowledge of a defect or of facts which indicate
a defect. The fact that plaintiff's employer, as lessee of the crane,
had an equal opportunity to discover the defect does not serve to
relieve the owner of liability. La Rocca v. Farrington, 301 N. Y.
247, 93 N. E. 2d 829 (1950).
The conclusion reached by the court finds its genesis in the
holding of Thomas v. Winchester.' The essence of that case was
that the finished article must be imminently dangerous to human life
14 Note, 58 YALE L. J. 615, 625, n. 44 (1949). These factors were for-
warded in reference to the Brooks case but they are applicable here.
1528 U. S. C. A. §2401(b) (1948).
18 Contributory negligence, assumption of risk and fellow servant theory.
'1728 U. S. C. A. § 2677 (1948).
18Feres v. United States, 71 Sup. Ct. 153, 155 (1950).
'6 N. Y. 381 (1852).
[ VOL. 25
RECENT DECISIONS
and that the danger must be caused by the negligence of the manu-
facturer. The liability was said to rest not upon any contract or
direct privity between the manufacturer and the party injured, but
upon the duty which the law imposes on everyone to avoid acts
which endanger the lives of others.2
For a time it was thought that application of the rule should
be limited to the manufacture of those articles which normally func-
tion as instruments of destruction. 3 But this belief was shattered by
the clear-cut ruling in Mac Pherson v. Buick Motor Co.4 wherein
it was declared, "... the principle . . . is not limited .. . to things
which in their normal operation are implements of destruction. If
the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place
life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of
danger ..... 
Following the rule as enunciated by judge Cardozo, liability has
been imposed upon a manufacturer for the injuries proximately caused
from the use by third persons of the following defective articles:
electric transformers,6 furnaces and boilers,.7 coffee urns,8 sanitary
napkin,9 ladder,10 chain," oxygen tank,12 sparklers,' 8 and eyebrow
and eyelash dye.14
However, some products such as defective slats on a wooden
bed,15 heel of a shoe,"' collapsible beach chair 17 and voting machines,' s
have been considered harmless even though negligently produced
because injury from such defectiveness was not foreseeable.
2 Id. at 410.
3 For example, drugs, firearms and explosives. See PRossER, TORTS 676(1941).4217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916).5Id. at 389, 111 N. E. at 1053.6 Rosebrock v. General Electric Co., 236 N. Y. 227, 140 N. E. 571 (1923).
7 Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock and Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209,
240 N. W. 392 (1932).8 Hoenig v. Central Stamping Co., 273 N. Y. 485, 6 N. E. 2d 415 (1936).
9La Frumento v. Kotex Co., 131 Misc. 314, 226 N. Y. Supp. 750 (N. Y.
City Ct. 1928).10 Kalash v. Los Angeles Ladder Co., 1 Cal. 2d 229, 34 P. 2d 481 (1934).
"I Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Columbus McKinnon Chain Co., 13
F. 2d 128 (W. D. N. Y. 1926).
'12 McLeod v. Linde Air. Prod. Co., 318 Mo. 397, 1 S. W. 2d 122 (1927).
23 Henry v. Crook, 202 App. Div. 19, 195 N. Y. Supp. 642 (3d Dep't 1922).
14 Accord, Bundy v. Ey-Tee, Inc., 160 Misc. 325, 289 N. Y. Supp. 905 (N. Y.
City Ct. 1935), nzotion for leave to appeal denied, 248 App. Div. 596, 288 N. Y.
Supp. 1078 (2d Dep't 1936).16 Field v. Empire Case Goods Co., 179 App. Div. 253, 166 N. Y. Supp. 509
(2d Dep't 1917).16 Sherwood v. Lax and Abowitz, 145 Misc. 578, 259 N. Y. Supp. 948
(Sup. Ct. 1932).
'7 Liedeker v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 249 App. Div. 835, 292 N. Y. Supp.
541 (2d Dep't), aff'd without opinion, 274 N. Y. 631, 10 N. E. 2d 586 (1937).
is Cf. Creedon v. Automatic Voting Machine Corp., 243 App. Div. 339, 276
N. S p. 609 (4th Dep't), aff'd zethout opinimo, 268 N. Y. 583, 198 N. E.415 (193).
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But the decision in the Mac Pherson case went no further than
to define the doctrine and fix the class of physical objects to which
it has application. It did not purport to determine-indeed, it care-
fully avoided doing so-the persons against whom it can be em-
ployed.1 9
In the instant case, the defendant contended that the rule was
intended to apply only to manufacturers and thus it has no applica-
tion where the defendant is a mere supplier. This was rejected.
It is submitted such rejection is sound. If such a restriction ever ex-
isted the underlying currents of legal reasoning in tort law has ef-
fected a drifting away from it. The present tendency is to impose
liability whenever the defendant's affirmative action in pursuit of
pecuniary profit adversely affects the interests of a third person. It
is apparent that this monetary benefit derived from the defendant's
activity constitutes a sufficient basis for his obligation to use due
care to protect third persons from harm. Moreover, the imposition
of such a legal duty produces a desirable social result. "The 'pro-
phylactic' factor of preventing future harm has been quite important
in the field of torts . . . When the decisions of the courts become
known, and the defendants realize that they may be held liable, there
is of course a strong incentive to prevent the occurrence of the
harm .... ,, 20
The extension of the doctrine to include suppliers has a basis
from the reasoning advanced by the Restatement 2' and the courts
of other jurisdictions.2 2 New York, however, is not devoid of analo-
gous authority. As early as 1892, such a holding was prophesied.2 3
In support of the liability found in the instant case it may be
said in conclusion that the supplier to secure pecuniary interest has
embarked in a business, that is, undertaken a positive course of con-
duct, which may injuriously affect the rights of others, and thus
should use due care; that life and limb will be imperiled is foreseeable
if the supplied chattel is defective; that the supplied party's reliance
19217 N. Y. 382, 389, 111 N. E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
20 PROssER, TORTS 27, 28 (1941).
2 1 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §388 (1934).
22 Milestone System v. Gasior, 160 Md. 131, 152 At. 810 (1931); Trusty
v. Patterson, 299 Pa. 469, 149 Atl. 717 (1930) ; see Note, Liability of Bailors
and Other Suppliers of Personal Property for Injuries Die to Defects, 78
U. PA. L. REv. 413 (1930).
23 Davies v. The Pelham Hod Elevating Co., 65 Hun 573, 578 (App. Div.
1st Dep't N. Y. 1892), aff'd without opinion, 146 N. Y. 363, 41 N. E. 88 (1895).
"We are of the opinion that the substitution by plaintiff's intestate of his ownjudgment for that of the defendant, in respect to the kind of rope that should
be used, is a complete answer to the claim made of negligence as against de-
fendant in having supplied him with the very thing ordered, and from the use
of which his injuries were received." See also MacKibbin v. Wilson and Eng-lish Construction Co., 263 App. Div. 1014, 33 N. Y. S. 2d 974 (2d Dep't),
leave to appeal denied, 288 N. Y. 738 (1942) (supplier had actual knowledge
of defect); Richards v. Texas Co., 245 App. Div. 797, 280 N. Y. Supp. 950(3d Dep't), leave to appeal denied, 268 N. Y. 728 (1935).
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on the supplier to inspect the chattel may be anticipated by the sup-
plier so that he knows the supplied party will not normally inspect
so as to protect those third persons who come in contact with it.
The last argument is especially applicable here because the chattel
was leased for immediate use; therefore, it was not reasonable for
the lessor to expect that the lessee would make a thorough inspec-
tion. The lessor should have realized that safe use of the chattel
can be secured only by taking precautions before turning the chat-
tel over to the lessee. 24
TORTs-Loss OF CONSORTIUM-WIFE MAY REcOVER FOR NEG-
LIGENT INJURY TO HUSBAND.-The plaintiff brought this action for
the loss of her consortium caused by the negligence of the defendant
in injuring her husband. The District Court for the District of
Columbia found for the defendant. Held, reversed and a new trial
granted. The wife may maintain an action for the loss of her con-
sortium caused by the negligence of a third party. Hitaffer v.
Argonne Co., 183 F. 2d 811 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U. S.
852 (1950).
Consortium has been defined in many ways; substantially it
inclu.des the right of a husband or a wife to the material and senti-
mental services' of the other. At common law prior to the Emanci-
pation Acts for women, a husband could recover for his loss of con-
sortium whether the injury to his wife was negligent 2 or intentional; 3
whether the damage was to the material services 4 or to the compan-
ionship, love and conjugal relation.5 The wife, on the other hand,
could not maintain an action in her own name, whether for assault
24 "One who leases a chattel as safe for immediate use is subject to lia-
bility to those whom he should expect to use the chattel, or to be in the vicinity
of its probable use, for bodily harm caused by its use in a manner for which
... it is leased, if the lessor fails to exercise reasonable care ... ." RSTATE-
mENT, TonTs § 408 (1934).
"Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P. 2d 147 (1940) ; Ramsey v. Ramsey,
4 W. W. Harr. 576, 156 Atl. 354 (Super. Ct. Del. 1931); Feneff v. N. Y.
Central and Hudson River R. R., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N. E. 436 (1909); see
CooLEY, TORTS 266, 267 (2d ed. 1888).
2 Little Rock Gas & Fuel Co. v. Coopedge et ux., 116 Ark. 334, 172 S. W.
885 (1915); Commercial Carriers, Inc. v. Small, 277 Ky. 189, 126 S. W. 2d
143 (1939); Kelly v. N. Y., N. H. & Hartford R. R., 168 Mass. 308, 38
L. R. A. 631 (1897); Guevin v. Manchester St. Ry., 78 N. H. 289, 99 Atl.
298 (1916).
3 McMillan v. Smith, 47 Ga. App. 646, 171 S. E. 169 (1933); Clouser v.
Clapper, 59 Ind. 548 (1877).
4 See Lippman, The Breakdovrn of Consortium, 30 COL. L. Rav. 651 (1930).
5 Clouser v. Clapper 59 Ind. 548 (1877); Pierce v. Crisp, 260 Ky. 519,
86 S. W. 2d 293 (19351; Root v. Goehring, 33 N. D. 413, 157 N. W. 293
(1916); Smith v. Hochenberry, 138 Mich. 129, 101 N. W. 207 (1904).
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